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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CARL W. THORSTENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SID WEESE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9899 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by respondent upon a Memorandum of 
Contract for the sale by respondent to the appellant of sixty-
four share of stock in Ogden U tab Knitting Company for 
$3,200.00. The appellant paid $2 ,200.00, and refused to pay 
the balance for the reason that the stock when the contract 
was entered into was worthless, and that the contract was 
entered into under mutual mistake of fact, both parties in 
good faith believing that the stock had substantial value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried to the Court without a jury. Judg-
ment was rendered in favor of the respondent for the unpaid 
balance of the contract, i. e., $1,000.00 and dismissing ap-
pellant's Counterclaim to rescind and for restsitution of the 
$2,200.00 _paid (R. 7, 10). 
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Ogden Utah Knitting Company for over sixty years was 
engaged at Ogden, Utah in the manufacture and sale of cer-
tain articles of wearing apparel. 
The agreement (R. 2) was entered into in good faith by 
both parties on December 28, 1961. Several months later, 
July, 1962, after the taking of a physical inventory, and upon 
preparation of a operating statement, it was determined that 
the company sustained an operating loss for the year 1961 of 
$159,289.00 (Tr. 52). The company had previously lost, 
without its fault, the right to use the trade-mark for LDS 
garments, the use of which, prior to the loss, accounted for 
more than fifty per cent of its total business. In 1961 it was 
attempting to convert its operations from manufacture of 
LDS garments to other lines of merchandise, and to establish 
a market for the new lines. Losses sustained by being deprived 
of the use of the LDS trade-mark, and inability to promote 
and establish itself in new lines resulted in the insolvency of 
the company. This was not, and could not be determined 
until after the taking of physical inventory early in 1962, 
and the audit of its financial affairs and the preparation by 
the company accountant of an operating and financial state-
ment for 1961. See testimony of Herbert ]. Corkey, Sr., CPA 
(Tr. 50-66 incl.). The company was bankrupt, (Tr. 19, 34, 
44, 45, 54, 55, 56, 59). 
Both respondent and appellant, at the time of entering 
into the purchase and sale agreement, were officers and em-
ployees of the company, and each thought the stock worth 
the agreed upon purchase price, i. e., $50.00 per share, where-
as the operating and financial statements later prepared are 
conclusive that the stock had no value. Both parties made 
inquiry from Charles C. Thorstensen, President-General Man-
ager, and principal stockholder of the company who had dur-
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ing 1961 paid $70.00 per share for some of the company stock, 
who advised them that in his opinion the stock was worth 
about $50.00 per share. Both relied on that (Tr. 23, 33). 
Appellant claims that since the stock actually had no 
value at the time of the agreement; that there was a mutual 
mistake of fact as to the stock having any value; that he is 
entitled to rescind the purchase agreement, and to recover that 
part of the purchase price already paid to the respondent, and 
that the respondent should retain the stock. The Trial Court 
found that the stock on December 28, 1961 had value, that 
both parties were assuming a risk in entering into the agree-
ment, and that there was not a mutual mistake of fact as to 
the value of said stock (R. 8). 
Appellant claims that the finding that the stock had value 
on December 28, 1961, and that there was not a mutual mis-
take of fact with respect to it having any value is contrary 
to all of the evidence, and that the Court then in effect dis-
believed all of the evidence adduced with respect to value, and 
that its findings, conclusions, and decree are based upon no 
evidence at all, and are contrary to all of the evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the findings, conclusions and 
judgment reversed, and the Trial Court instructed to enter 
contrary findings and conclusions, and enter judgment in favor 
of the appellant permitting him to rescind and to recover from 
respondent that part of the purchase price already paid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Is an action brought by respondent against the ap-
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pellant for judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 with interest, 
representing the unpaid balance of an agreement dated Decem-
ber 28, 1961 between the parties wherein appellant agreed to 
purchase sixty-four shares of stock in Ogden Utah Knitting 
Company, a Utah corporation, doing business at Ogden, Utah. 
Appellant paid $2,000.00 on the agreement at the time of its 
execution, and agreed to pay the balance of $1,200.00 at 
$100.00 per month beginning with January 31, 1962. He paid 
two monthly installments, and then upon discovering that the 
stock had no value at the time of execution of the agreement 
refused to pay more, and demanded the return of that part 
of the price already paid. 
Respondent was a stockholder and had been since 1940, 
and was vice president of the corporation. Appellant was ap-
pointed manager of the corporation October 8, 1961, at which 
time he was given twenty-five shares of stock in the corpora-
tion by the president of the company, (Tr. 20). 
While there was some reason to believe the company was 
having some financial troubles, the extent and effect thereof 
were not known until after the closing of its books, prepara-
tion of inventory, operating statement and financial state-
ment, and a determination made therefrom in July, 1962, 
(Tr. 54). At that time it was determinied by the company 
auditor, Herbert ]. Corkey, Sr., CPA, that the company was 
insolvent, its assets so depleted that any value theretofore had 
by the stock was completely wiped out, and it was unable to 
meet its obligations to other creditors, and that that condition 
existed back and prior to the date of the purchase agreement, 
and that neither of the contracting parties knew, or could have 
known these facts until the CPA had made his determination 
and report. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF. THE COURT THAT "THE STOCK ON OR 
ABOUT DECEMBER 28th HAD VALUE, AND BOTH 
PARTIES WERE ASSUMING A RISK IN ENTERING 
INTO THE STOCK SALE, AND THERE WAS NOT A 
MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO THE VALUE OF SAID 
STOCK." 
POINT II 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE CONCLUSION THAT "PLAINTIFF SHOULD 
BE AWARDED THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND 
($1,000.00) DOLLARS AS DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT, AND THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE 
AWARDED THE SIXTY-FOUR (64) SHARES OF 
STOCK, AND DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH NO CAUSE OF AC-
TION." AND SAID CONCLUSION IS AGAINST LAW. 
POINT III 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE CONCLUSION THAT "JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, 
AND AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR THE SUM OF ONE 
THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS, AND FOR IN-
TEREST AND COURT COSTS INCURRED HEREIN, 
AND DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED THE SIX-
TY-FOUR (64) SHARES OF STOCK IN SAID CORPOR-
ATION AND DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM DIS-
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MISSED WITH NO CAUSE FOR ACTION." AND SAID 
CONCLUSION IS AGAINST LAW. 
POINT IV 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE 
SUM OF ONE THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS, TO-
GETHER WITH INTEREST AT SIX (6%) PER CENT, 
AND COSTS, OR ANY SUl\1 AT ALL, AND SAID JUDG-
MENT IS AGAINST LAW. 
Since all of the points stated, and relied upon by the 
appellant, tie into and relate to the salient claim of the ap-
pellant, i. e., that the agreement was entered into through 
a mutual mistake of fact, in the interest of time and space, 
it would appear proper to argue all of said points concurrently. 
The following facts are not controverted by any evidence: 
1. There was no quoted market value for the stock 
described in the agreement to purchase. 
2. That both appellant and respondent believed as a 
fact that the stock had substantial value. 
3. That at the time the agreement was executed, the 
stock had no value. 
4. That fact number "3" was not established, and 
could not be established by them, or either of them at 
or prior to the execution of the agreement. 
5. That the stock has never been delivered to the ap-
pellant. 
6. That appellant and respondent relied upon the same 
source of information in fixing value. 
7. That there was no consideration for appellant's 
6 
t 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
promise to pay, and for the payments actually made. 
8. There is no evidence of changed conditions in re-
spondent's position. Lawson vs. Woodmen of the 
World, 88 Utah, 267, 53, Pac. 2d. 432. 
Appellant claims, in view of the foregoing, that he is in 
no different position than one who buys spurious stock from 
another, neither of whom knowing the stock was spurious, but 
believing it to be genuine. The issue here is not "market 
value" of the stock, but that the stock had no value at all: 
"It is a firmly established general rule that money 
paid to another under the influence of a mistake of 
fact, that is, on the mistaken supposition of the ex-
istence of a specific fact which would entitle the 
other to the money, which would not have been paid, 
if it had been known to the payor that the fact was 
otherwise, may be recovered provided the payment 
has not caused such a change in the position of the 
payee that it would be unjust to require a refund." 
40 Am. Jur., Payment, Sec. 187. (See also Williston 
on Contracts, Sec. 1556-1573); Restatement Resti-
tution, Sec. 26, 39, 49; American National Bank of 
Chicago vs. McKay 102 F. 662; Great Northern Ry. 
Co. vs. Reid, 245 F. 86. There is no evidence of 
changed conditions, Utley vs. Donaldson 94 U.S. 29. 
"To recover money paid under mistake, the pay-
ment must have been made under a mistaken belief 
that the money was due the payee, when in truth 
it was neither legally nor morally due. An error of 
fact is ordinarily said to take place either when some 
fact which really exists is unknown, or some fact is 
supposed to exist, which really does not exist." 40 
Am. Jur., Payment, Sec. 189, 193; Smith vs. Rubel, 
140 Ore. 422, 13 Pac. 2d 1078; 87 A.L.R. 647; 
Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. vs. Towne, 136 Minn. 72, 
161 N.W. 403; Sutton vs. Peterson (Wash.) 1938, 
74 Pac. 2d 885. 
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The only evidence as to the value of this stock, or 
whether it actually had any value at all is found in the testi-
mony of the expert witness, Herbert J. Corkey, Sr., CPA. 
His testimony contains an analysis of the facts and conditions 
upon which value must be based. His testimony is fairly 
short, (Tr. 50-60). The writer is of the opinion that a read-
ing of this witness' testimony in full by the Court would be 
far more enlightening on the issue involved than by quoting 
select portions of it. 
It is said in Am. Jur. 40, Payment, Section 216, "Money 
Paid for Worthless Articles," 
"It is firmly established that an action lies to recover 
back money paid for an article which is entirely 
worthless. Thus, a purchaser and holder of counter-
feit United States bonds, redeemed by the United 
States after his purchase, may recover the purchase 
money without returning the bonds, and before re-
paying the United States, and money paid for a bill 
which turns out to be counterfeit may be recovered, 
for a payment for such a bill must be regarded as a 
payment by mistake for a thing of no value, but 
which was, at the time it was received, believed to 
be and imported on its face to be of instrinsic worth." 
This Court said in Board of Education of Sevier School 
District vs. Board of Education of Piute School District, 85 
Ut. 276, 39 Pac. 2d. 340, apparently quoting with approval 
from 13 C. ]. Page 377, 
"That where certain facts assumed by both parties 
are the basis of a contract, and subsequently it ap-
pears that such facts did not exist THERE IS NO 
AGREEMENT, and thus where parties agree in 
regard to a thing which unknown to both parties 
does not exist at the time THERE IS NO CON-
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TRACT. THERE IS NO SUBJECT MATTER." 
(Emphasis ours). 
It is said in 13 C.]., Page 369, 
"A mistake of fact takes place when some material 
fact which really exists is unknown or when some 
essential fact, which is supposed to exist really does 
not exist" and on Page 3 7 5, "a mutual mistake as 
to material facts will void the agreement." (Citing 
cases). 
Applying this rule to the instant case, the Ogden Utah 
Knitting Company was insolvent, and its stock had no value, 
but on the contrary a negative value, (Tr. 55). There is no 
evidence in this record to the contrary. Hence, a material 
fact (insolvency hence no value) existed at the time the agree-
ment was executed and this fact was unkown. Put conversely, 
the contracting parties assumed the fact to be that the com-
pany was solvent, and that its stock had value, which fact did 
not exist. In the school board case (supra), the contracting 
parties entered into an agreement with respect to the location 
of the precinct of Koosharem. This contract between the two 
districts was based upon the assumption or belief that it was 
uncertain in which of the two contracting districts the said 
precinct was located, and the agreement concerned itself with 
a payment of costs, and expenses of the school located in 
Koosharem by the two contracting parties, since the fact as-
sumed was that the location of the Koosharem precinct, 
whether in plaintiff or defendant district, was uncertain, they 
agreed to share the costs. It subsequently developed and the 
true facts were that by a previous court decision it had been 
definitely established that Koosharem was located in the plain-
tiff district. Hence, this Court found and decided that since 
both the contracting parties were mistaken with respect to a 
material fact (location), that there was no basis for the con-
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tract. This Court said; "THE SURVEY WAS ACKNOWL-
EDGED, AND EVER SINCE ACQUIESCED IN, AND SO ~ 
FAR AS MADE TO APPEAR WAS NOT QUESTIONED ,.&l 
UNTIL 1923 WHEN THE THEN MEMBERS OF THE 
SCHOOL BOARDS ASSUMED THERE WAS SOME UN- ;: 
CERTAINTY WHICH DID NOT EXIST AS TO THE 
TRUE BOUNDARY LINE. THE MEMBERS OF THE pr.-
TWO BOARDS WHO ENTERED INTO THE AGREE- ~b 
MENT MAY HAVE BEEN IGNORANT OF SUCH SUR-
VEY, AND OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH 
BOUNDARY LINE. WHETHER THEY WERE OR NOT, 
THEIR ASSUMPTION OF UNCERTAINTY HAD NO ltm 
EXISTENCE IN FACT." (Emphasis ours). "Notwith- ~.iii. 
standing that, it now, because of an unfounded and non- me.: 
existing uncertainty, and mutual mistake of fact, not of law, lnl"" 
seeks to enforce the contract or agreement against the Piute 
School District, which is still executory on behalf of the 
latter." 
The Trial Court refused to enforce the agreement on the 
grounds of want of power, and of legal authority of the Boards 
to enter into such an agreement. With respect to that theory 
this Court said; "Much may be said in support of that, but 
in examining the ruling we need not go that far. We prefer 
to put the affirmance on rules and principle of equity as 
shown by authorities referred to, and under which relief 
should be granted against the enforcement of the agreement 
as alleged in the Complaint, and not as found by the Court." 
Numerous other authorities could be cited. (See Bowles vs. 
Miller, Colo. 1935, 40 Pac. 2d 243). However, in the opinion 
of the writer the above and foregoing authorities cited state 
the general rule, and the great weight of authority. Further 
citations would be more or less cumulative and time and space 
consuming. 
10 
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It is inconsistent, in view of the facts and evidence in 
this case, that appellant would have agreed to purchase this 
stock had he not believed that it had substantial value. The 
evidence is conclusive that he did believe it had substantial 
value; that respondent believed it had substantial value, and 
that both parties relied upon these assumed facts which did 
not exist, and hence were mutually mistaken; not that one 
party believed it had one value and the other party believing 
it had a different value, but uniting on a mistaken belief that 
the facts were that it did have substantial value, and that a 
reliance upon that fact was a material element relied upon in 
the consummation of the agreement. The uncontroverted facts 
are that contrary to the judgment of the Trial Court the parties 
were actually contracting to buy and to sell nothing. If appel-
lant rescinds and is granted restitution, the respondent loses 
nothing. He still has his stock which is worth nothing. 
If, on the other hand, the judgment of the Trial Court 
is permitted to stand, then appellant will be required to 
pay $3 ,200.00, and get nothing in return. In other words, it 
sums up to the fact that there was no consideration for the 
transaction from its inception, and equity proposes and under-
takes to avoid such a result. Assuming for the sake of the 
argument that the stock in question actually belonged to a 
third party, but that both of the contracting parties believed 
it belonged to the respondent who was not acting by or in 
behalf of, or under circumstances in which he could bind the 
true owner, so far as the parties in that case are concerned, 
the stock would have no value to either of the contracting 
parties, and hence there would be no consideration for the 
contract. It would seem to the writer that the ultimate facts 
in that hypothetical case, and the instant case would be iden-
tical, and that the rule of law which would permit, under the 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assumed circumstances, rescission and restitution, applies with 
equal force and to the same effect in the instant case. 
Notice of Rescission of Contract was not necessary to 
maintenance of action for moneys had and received on the 
ground that there has been a total failure of consideration, 
Westbrook vs. Reneau, 278 Pac. 2d 32, 129 C.A. 2d 715. 
Cherry vs. Hayden, 223 Pac. 2d 878-100 C.A. 2d 416. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it would seem on the record in this case 
that equity compels the reversal of the judgment of the Trial 
Court, because it is based upon findings of fact and con-
clusions of law which are diametrically opposed to not only 
the weight of, but all of the evidence in the case. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
reversed, findings should be made contrary to those found by 
the Trial Court, the conclusions and judgment reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 
IRA A. HUGGINS. 
12 
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